论文标题
两订单顺序多单元拍卖的无政府状态价格
The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了具有两种购买者和完整信息的顺序多单元拍卖的效率。对于一般估值功能，我们表明无政府状态的价格恰好是$ 1/t $的$ T $物品。对于凹入估值功能，我们表明，无政府状态的价格下方为$ 1-1/e \ simeq 0.632 $。随着出售物品的数量倾向于无穷大。
We study the efficiency of sequential multiunit auctions with two-buyers and complete information. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly $1/T$ for auctions with $T$ items for sale. For concave valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is bounded below by $1-1/e\simeq 0.632$. This bound is asymptotically tight as the number of items sold tends to infinity.
