论文标题
只有时间可以说：可靠的动态信号
Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling
论文作者
论文摘要
本文以动态信号传导模型具有消失的承诺能力来表征信息结果。它表明，与普遍的信念相反，与回报相关的信号的信息均衡可以存在，而无需不合理的远视信念。本文提供了可能分离平衡的尖锐表征：所有信号必须通过损耗进行，当最弱的类型揭示自己的类型和与更强类型的合并之间的混合在一起时。本文中探讨的框架是一般的，仅对收益单调性和单跨性别施加最小的假设。开发了在特定环境中展示结果，以证明其结果。
This paper characterizes informational outcomes in a model of dynamic signaling with vanishing commitment power. It shows that contrary to popular belief, informative equilibria with payoff-relevant signaling can exist without requiring unreasonable off-path beliefs. The paper provides a sharp characterization of possible separating equilibria: all signaling must take place through attrition, when the weakest type mixes between revealing own type and pooling with the stronger types. The framework explored in the paper is general, imposing only minimal assumptions on payoff monotonicity and single-crossing. Applications to bargaining, monopoly price signaling, and labor market signaling are developed to demonstrate the results in specific contexts.
