论文标题
自由能原理是语义的形式理论吗？从变分密度动力学到神经和表型表示
Is the free-energy principle a formal theory of semantics? From variational density dynamics to neural and phenotypic representations
论文作者
论文摘要
本文的目的是双重的：（1）评估神经表示的构造是否在变分的自由能原理及其推论理论（主动推论）下起着解释性作用； （2）如果是的，则最合适的是评估哪种哲学立场 - 与代表的本体论和认识论状态有关。我们专注于非现实主义者（通缩和虚构主义者乐器主义者）的方法。我们考虑了对心理表征的通缩性说明，根据该解释性，神经表示的解释性相关内容是数学的，而不是认知，而虚构主义者或工具主义的说法，根据这些说法，表达是科学有用的小说，它们具有解释性（和其他）目的。在回顾了自由能原理和主动推断之后，我们认为自由能原理下的自适应表型模型可用于提供正式的语义，使我们能够将语义内容分配给特定表型状态（Markovian系统的内部状态（Markovian系统的内部状态），该状态远非平衡）。我们提出了一个修改后的虚构主义叙述：以生物为中心的虚构主义或工具主义。我们认为，根据自由能的原则，即使对神经代表的内容进行通缩说明，许可对认知系统的关于性或意图涉及的语义内容的吸引力。因此，我们的立场与现实主义立场的不同假设相结合，但取决于现实主义的立场。我们认为，自由能原理因此解释了生活系统中的关于性或意图的性质，因此他们使用本体论或一组语义因素来解析感觉流的能力。
The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of neural representations plays an explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference; and (2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance - in relation to the ontological and epistemological status of representations - is most appropriate. We focus on non-realist (deflationary and fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary account of mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a fictionalist or instrumentalist account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and other) aims. After reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to furnish a formal semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific phenotypic states (the internal states of a Markovian system that exists far from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account: an organism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We argue that, under the free-energy principle, pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of neural representations licenses the appeal to the kind of semantic content involved in the aboutness or intentionality of cognitive systems; our position is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist position. We argue that the free-energy principle thereby explains the aboutness or intentionality in living systems and hence their capacity to parse their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.
