论文标题
寻找最佳的Stackelberg生产策略：如何在战争时期生产？
Finding optimal Stackelberg production strategies: How to produce in times of war?
论文作者
论文摘要
受军事背景的启发，我们研究了一场居住的生产游戏，一个国家的政府（领导人）希望最大化军事资产的生产。领导者通过在一组生产设施中分配他的资源来做到这一点。他的对手追随者观察了这种分配，并试图通过分配破坏性资源（例如炸弹）来尽可能地破坏相关的生产。在本文中，我们确定了追随者的最佳策略。对于领导者而言，我们表明可以在所谓的连续平衡策略类别中找到最佳的生产策略。我们提出了一种线性时间算法，该算法在此类中找到了最佳策略。
Inspired by a military context, we study a Stackelberg production game where a country's government, the leader, wants to maximize the production of military assets. The leader does so by allocating his resources among a set of production facilities. His opponent, the follower, observes this allocation and tries to destroy the associated production as much as possible by allocating his destructive resources, for example bombs, among these facilities. In this paper, we identify a follower's optimal strategy. For the leader, we show that an optimal production strategy can be found in the class of so-called seried-balanced strategies. We present a linear time algorithm that finds an optimal strategy in this class.
