论文标题
负电容晶体管（NCFET）中的功率侧通道攻击
Power Side-Channel Attacks in Negative Capacitance Transistor (NCFET)
论文作者
论文摘要
侧向通道攻击赋予了电路中加密组件的绕过的能力。电力侧通道（PSC）攻击因其无侵入性和可证明的有效性而受到了特殊的牵引力。除了以常规技术为重点的艺术外，这是研究PSC攻击背景下新兴负电容晶体管（NCFET）技术的第一项工作。我们在设计时间内实施用于PSC评估的CAD流。它利用行业标准的设计工具，同时还采用了广泛接受的相关能力分析（CPA）攻击。我们的评估使用基于NCFET的7NM FinFET技术及其对应的CMOS设置的标准细胞库，这表明基于NCFET的电路对经典CPA攻击更具弹性，因为负能力对开关功率产生了相当大的影响。我们还证明，铁电层越厚，基于NCFET的电路的弹性越高，这为优化和权衡打开了新的门。
Side-channel attacks have empowered bypassing of cryptographic components in circuits. Power side-channel (PSC) attacks have received particular traction, owing to their non-invasiveness and proven effectiveness. Aside from prior art focused on conventional technologies, this is the first work to investigate the emerging Negative Capacitance Transistor (NCFET) technology in the context of PSC attacks. We implement a CAD flow for PSC evaluation at design-time. It leverages industry-standard design tools, while also employing the widely-accepted correlation power analysis (CPA) attack. Using standard-cell libraries based on the 7nm FinFET technology for NCFET and its counterpart CMOS setup, our evaluation reveals that NCFET-based circuits are more resilient to the classical CPA attack, due to the considerable effect of negative capacitance on the switching power. We also demonstrate that the thicker the ferroelectric layer, the higher the resiliency of the NCFET-based circuit, which opens new doors for optimization and trade-offs.
