论文标题
重复匹配市场的稳定性
Stability in Repeated Matching Markets
论文作者
论文摘要
本文为重复匹配市场开发了一个框架。该模型在每个时期都与新一代短暂的居民配对，与大风 - 夏普利匹配的模型相偏离了大风 - 夏普利匹配模型。我表明，在这种重复的环境中，有两种医院：有些医院可以动态动机以自愿降低其招聘能力，有可能使更多居民可用于农村医院；但是，即使有重复的相互作用，其他人也无法接触，并且必须获得与静态匹配中相同的匹配。在具有相关偏好相关的大型匹配市场中，最多消失的医院一小部分是无法触及的。绝大多数医院都可以使用动态激励措施来激励。
This paper develops a framework for repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived hospitals match with a new generation of short-lived residents in every period. I show that there are two kinds of hospitals in this repeated environment: some hospitals can be motivated dynamically to voluntarily reduce their hiring capacity, potentially making more residents available to rural hospitals; the others, however, are untouchable even with repeated interaction and must obtain the same match as they do in a static matching. In large matching markets with correlated preferences, at most a vanishingly small fraction of the hospitals are untouchable. The vast majority of hospitals can be motivated using dynamic incentives.
