论文标题
集体嫉妒的Freeness和集体帕累托在公平部门的效率不可分割的物品
Group Envy Freeness and Group Pareto Efficiency in Fair Division with Indivisible Items
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究代理商的公平划分，假设代理可以组成群体。因此，我们对固定尺寸的群体进行了自然概括（例如嫉妒和帕累托效率）的自然概括。团体嫉妒的福祉要求没有团体羡慕另一个小组。小组帕累托效率要求没有其他团体变得更糟，不能使任何团体变得更好。我们从公理角度研究了这些新的组属性。因此，我们提出了新的公平分类法，以概括现有的分类法。我们进一步研究了这些群体属性的版本，因为其中一些分配可能不存在。我们最终给出了三个共同的社会福利（即功利主义，平等和纳什）的团体财产之间的三个群体公平价格。
We study the fair division of items to agents supposing that agents can form groups. We thus give natural generalizations of popular concepts such as envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency to groups of fixed sizes. Group envy-freeness requires that no group envies another group. Group Pareto efficiency requires that no group can be made better off without another group be made worse off. We study these new group properties from an axiomatic viewpoint. We thus propose new fairness taxonomies that generalize existing taxonomies. We further study near versions of these group properties as allocations for some of them may not exist. We finally give three prices of group fairness between group properties for three common social welfares (i.e. utilitarian, egalitarian, and Nash).
