论文标题
在不平衡状态下测量两党党派偏见
On measuring two-party partisan bias in unbalanced states
论文作者
论文摘要
假设党派的公平性和响应能力是重新划分的重要方面,那么衡量它们很重要。对于与两个主要政党的选民比例平衡的州,党派偏见的许多措施令人满意。当投票的比例不平衡到60%至40%时,尚不清楚哪种指标可以牢固地衡量公平性。我们已经通过分析了四个具有民主偏好的州(CA,IL,MA和MD),三个具有共和党偏好(SC,TN和TX)的州的过去选举结果,并将这些结果与四个几乎平衡国家(CO,NC,OH和PA)进行比较。我们在每个州都使用了许多过去的全州选举来建立统计上精确的选票席位,并为投票图的排名对党派偏见进行了许多措施。除了提供响应能力的值外,我们还发现,五个偏见度量在所有州提供了相互一致的值,从而为不平衡状态提供了可用措施的核心。尽管所有五个措施都集中在党派偏见的不同方面,但整个11个州的值的归一化提供了一种比较它们的合适方法,我们建议它们的平均值提供了一种较高的措施,我们称之为复合偏见。关于其他措施,我们发现不平衡状态最为看似最合理的对称度量失败。我们还考虑了与比例理想的偏差,但是使用它很困难,因为一个国家的政治地理可以与党派偏见纠缠在一起。我们不会试图将故意的党派偏见与隐性偏见分开,而这些偏见是由于地图绘制国家及其政治地理规则的相互作用而导致的,理由是重新划分应试图最大程度地减少党派偏见,无论其出处如何。
Assuming that partisan fairness and responsiveness are important aspects of redistricting, it is important to measure them. Many measures of partisan bias are satisfactory for states that are balanced with roughly equal proportions of voters for the two major parties. It has been less clear which metrics measure fairness robustly when the proportion of the vote is unbalanced by as little as 60% to 40%. We have addressed this by analyzing past election results for four states with Democratic preferences (CA, IL, MA, and MD), three states with Republican preferences (SC, TN, and TX) and comparing those to results for four nearly balanced states (CO, NC, OH, and PA). We used many past statewide elections in each state to build statistically precise seats for votes and rank for votes graphs to which many measures of partisan bias were applied. In addition to providing values of responsiveness, we find that five of the measures of bias provide mutually consistent values in all states, thereby providing a core of usable measures for unbalanced states. Although all five measures focus on different aspects of partisan bias, normalization of the values across the eleven states provides a suitable way to compare them, and we propose that their average provides a superior measure which we call composite bias. Regarding other measures, we find that the most seemingly plausible symmetry measure fails for unbalanced states. We also consider deviations from the proportionality ideal, but using it is difficult because the political geography of a state can entangle responsiveness with total partisan bias. We do not attempt to separate intentional partisan bias from the implicit bias that results from the interaction of the map drawing rules of a state and its political geography, on the grounds that redistricting should attempt to minimize total partisan bias whatever its provenance.