论文标题
无法替代功能主义 - 对“伪造和意识”的答复
No Substitute for Functionalism -- A Reply to 'Falsification & Consciousness'
论文作者
论文摘要
克莱纳（Kleiner）和霍尔（Hoel）在他们的论文“伪造和意识” [1]中引入了一种正式的数学模型，该模型是从实验中生成可观察到的数据的过程，并使用该数据将推论和预测在体验空间中生成推断和预测。在此框架上构建的由此产生的替代参数用于表明，如果推断报告被认为有效，则具有独立推论和预测数据的任何意识理论都是预先实现的。如果该论点确实确实预先验证了许多意识的主要理论，则将表明影响整个意识领域的根本问题，这将需要对意识科学的执行方式进行根本性的改变。在此答复中，作者将确定[1]中提出的模型的扩展途径，从而使我们能够区分不同类型的变化。受神经网络，州机器和图灵机器的示例的启发，我们将证明，对于非常广泛的1级功能主义理论而言，替换不存在，使它们不受上述替代论点的影响。
In their paper 'Falsification and Consciousness' [1], Kleiner and Hoel introduced a formal mathematical model of the process of generating observable data from experiments and using that data to generate inferences and predictions onto an experience space. The resulting substitution argument built on this framework was used to show that any theory of consciousness with independent inference and prediction data are pre-falsified, if the inference reports are considered valid. If this argument does indeed pre-falsify many of the leading theories of consciousness, it would indicate a fundamental problem affecting the field of consciousness as a whole that would require radical changes to how consciousness science is performed. In this reply, the author will identify avenues of expansion for the model proposed in [1], allowing us to distinguish between different types of variation. Motivated by examples from neural networks, state machines and Turing machines, we will prove that substitutions do not exist for a very broad class of Level-1 functionalist theories, rendering them immune to the aforementioned substitution argument.
