论文标题
纳什先生：病毒流行期间战略行为的经济 - 流行学模型
Nash SIR: An Economic-Epidemiological Model of Strategic Behavior During a Viral Epidemic
论文作者
论文摘要
本文开发了经典的感染性疾病流行病学的经典SIR模型（“ Nash Sir”）的NASH平衡扩展，使人们在病毒流行期间是否从事经济活动并允许社会经济活动中的互补性。平衡流行是一种在流行期间纳什平衡行为引起流行病的流行。可能存在多种平衡流行病，在这种情况下，除其他种类的干预措施（例如在家订单和加速疫苗的发展）外，还可以通过期望的协调来塑造流行轨迹。提供了一种算法来计算所有均衡流行病。
This paper develops a Nash-equilibrium extension of the classic SIR model of infectious-disease epidemiology ("Nash SIR"), endogenizing people's decisions whether to engage in economic activity during a viral epidemic and allowing for complementarity in social-economic activity. An equilibrium epidemic is one in which Nash equilibrium behavior during the epidemic generates the epidemic. There may be multiple equilibrium epidemics, in which case the epidemic trajectory can be shaped through the coordination of expectations, in addition to other sorts of interventions such as stay-at-home orders and accelerated vaccine development. An algorithm is provided to compute all equilibrium epidemics.
