论文标题
最佳注意力管理：一个可拖动的框架
Optimal Attention Management: A Tractable Framework
论文作者
论文摘要
善意的校长为理性的不专心代理提供信息，而无需内化代理商的处理信息成本。无论校长提供什么信息，代理商都可以选择忽略一些信息。我们在具有二次收益的可访问模型中研究最佳信息提供，而完全披露并非最佳。我们表征了与激励兼容的信息策略，即代理商愿意全心关注的信息政策。在三个州的主要示例中，最佳披露涉及以中间注意成本的信息失真。随着成本的增加，最佳信息突然从低估国家到夸大国家。
A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some. We study optimal information provision in a tractable model with quadratic payoffs where full disclosure is not optimal. We characterize incentive-compatible information policies, that is, those to which the agent willingly pays full attention. In a leading example with three states, optimal disclosure involves information distortion at intermediate costs of attention. As the cost increases, optimal information abruptly changes from downplaying the state to exaggerating the state.
