论文标题
CANOA：可以通过功率侧通道监视来定位验证
CANOA: CAN Origin Authentication Through Power Side-Channel Monitoring
论文作者
论文摘要
缺乏任何发件人身份验证机制使CAN（控制器区域网络）容易受到安全威胁的影响。例如，攻击者可以在公共汽车上冒充ECU（电子控制单元），并使用模仿的ECU的标识符毫不客气地发送欺骗消息。为了解决这个问题，我们提出了一种新颖的发送者身份验证技术，该技术使用ECU的功耗测量值来验证消息的发件人。当ECU传输时，其功率要求会受到影响，并且具有特征性模式在其功耗中出现。我们的技术在传输消息期间利用了每个ECU的功耗，以确定消息是否真正起源于所谓的发件人。我们在实验室设置和真正的车辆中评估了我们的方法。我们还评估了我们的方法与可能影响ECU功耗测量的因素。评估的结果表明，提出的技术适用于具有合理的计算能力要求并获得良好准确性的广泛操作条件。
The lack of any sender authentication mechanism in place makes CAN (Controller Area Network) vulnerable to security threats. For instance, an attacker can impersonate an ECU (Electronic Control Unit) on the bus and send spoofed messages unobtrusively with the identifier of the impersonated ECU. To address this problem, we propose a novel sender authentication technique that uses power consumption measurements of the ECU to authenticate the sender of a message. When an ECU is transmitting, its power requirement is affected, and a characteristic pattern appears in its power consumption. Our technique exploits the power consumption of each ECU during the transmission of a message to determine whether the message actually originated from the purported sender. We evaluate our approach in both a lab setup and a real vehicle. We also evaluate our approach against factors that can impact the power consumption measurement of the ECU. The results of the evaluation show that the proposed technique is applicable in a broad range of operating conditions with reasonable computational power requirements and attaining good accuracy.
