论文标题
数据和激励措施
Data and Incentives
论文作者
论文摘要
“大数据”使市场可以访问以前无法满足的个体代理特征。决策者必须决定是否以及如何调节此数据的使用。我们研究新数据如何影响代理商在劳动力市场等环境中付出努力的激励措施，在劳动力市场上，代理商的质量最初是未知的，但可以从可观察到的结果中预测。我们表明，新协变量的测量对代理人所施加的平均努力具有系统的影响，其效果方向取决于协变量是否对长期质量有用，还是对短期结果的震惊。对于满足统计特性的一类协变量，我们称之为强的同性恋性，这种效应在整个代理之间都是均匀的。更一般而言，新的测量结果可能会不平等地影响代理，我们表明这些分布效应对社会福利产生了一阶影响。
"Big data" gives markets access to previously unmeasured characteristics of individual agents. Policymakers must decide whether and how to regulate the use of this data. We study how new data affects incentives for agents to exert effort in settings such as the labor market, where an agent's quality is initially unknown but is forecast from an observable outcome. We show that measurement of a new covariate has a systematic effect on the average effort exerted by agents, with the direction of the effect determined by whether the covariate is informative about long-run quality or about a shock to short-run outcomes. For a class of covariates satisfying a statistical property we call strong homoskedasticity, this effect is uniform across agents. More generally, new measurements can impact agents unequally, and we show that these distributional effects have a first-order impact on social welfare.
