论文标题
研究基于训练机学习的逃避攻击的光谱欺骗损失度量
Investigating a Spectral Deception Loss Metric for Training Machine Learning-based Evasion Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
对抗性逃避攻击在各种机器学习应用中导致性能差,非常成功。这样的应用是射频频谱传感。尽管逃避攻击在这一领域已被证明是特别成功的,但他们确实损害了信号的预期目的。更具体地说,对于现实世界中关注的应用程序,传播以逃避窃听器的扰动信号不得偏离原始信号,较少的预期信息被破坏了。作者和其他人的最新工作展示了一个攻击框架,可以在这些逃避和沟通的矛盾目标之间进行智能平衡。但是,尽管这些方法考虑创建最大程度地减少通信降解的对抗信号,但它们已被证明是以信号的频谱形状为代价。这为对抗性信号打开了窃听器的防御,例如过滤,这可能使攻击无效。为了解决这一点,这项工作引入了一个新的光谱欺骗损失度量,可以在训练过程中实现,以迫使光谱形状与原始信号更加串联。作为最初的概念证明,提出了多种方法,这些方法为这一提议的损失提供了起点。通过性能分析,可以表明这些技术可有效控制对抗信号的形状。
Adversarial evasion attacks have been very successful in causing poor performance in a wide variety of machine learning applications. One such application is radio frequency spectrum sensing. While evasion attacks have proven particularly successful in this area, they have done so at the detriment of the signal's intended purpose. More specifically, for real-world applications of interest, the resulting perturbed signal that is transmitted to evade an eavesdropper must not deviate far from the original signal, less the intended information is destroyed. Recent work by the authors and others has demonstrated an attack framework that allows for intelligent balancing between these conflicting goals of evasion and communication. However, while these methodologies consider creating adversarial signals that minimize communications degradation, they have been shown to do so at the expense of the spectral shape of the signal. This opens the adversarial signal up to defenses at the eavesdropper such as filtering, which could render the attack ineffective. To remedy this, this work introduces a new spectral deception loss metric that can be implemented during the training process to force the spectral shape to be more in-line with the original signal. As an initial proof of concept, a variety of methods are presented that provide a starting point for this proposed loss. Through performance analysis, it is shown that these techniques are effective in controlling the shape of the adversarial signal.