论文标题
Chirpotle：实用洛但安全评估框架
ChirpOTLE: A Framework for Practical LoRaWAN Security Evaluation
论文作者
论文摘要
低功率广阔的区域网络（LPWANS）已成为物联网不可或缺的一部分。结果，企业，管理以及随后的社会本身取决于这些通信网络的可靠性和可用性。洛万（Lorawan）于2015年发行，获得了人们的知名度，并吸引了安全研究的重点，揭示了许多漏洞。这导致了2017年底修订的洛万1.1规格。以前的大多数工作都集中在模拟和理论方法上。互操作性和各种实施使特定洛拉万网络的风险评估变得复杂。在本文中，我们通过介绍Chirpotle，劳拉和劳拉万安全评估框架来解决这些问题，适合于快速迭代和测试测试床中的攻击并评估现实世界网络的安全性。我们通过使用适应性数据速率的新型拒绝攻击攻击适用于常见的型号的拒绝攻击来证明我们的框架的潜力。此外，我们还显示了B类Beacon欺骗攻击的可行性，这在实践中尚未证明。
Low-power wide-area networks (LPWANs) are becoming an integral part of the Internet of Things. As a consequence, businesses, administration, and, subsequently, society itself depend on the reliability and availability of these communication networks. Released in 2015, LoRaWAN gained popularity and attracted the focus of security research, revealing a number of vulnerabilities. This lead to the revised LoRaWAN 1.1 specification in late 2017. Most of previous work focused on simulation and theoretical approaches. Interoperability and the variety of implementations complicate the risk assessment for a specific LoRaWAN network. In this paper, we address these issues by introducing ChirpOTLE, a LoRa and LoRaWAN security evaluation framework suitable for rapid iteration and testing of attacks in testbeds and assessing the security of real-world networks.We demonstrate the potential of our framework by verifying the applicability of a novel denial-of-service attack targeting the adaptive data rate mechanism in a testbed using common off-the-shelf hardware. Furthermore, we show the feasibility of the Class B beacon spoofing attack, which has not been demonstrated in practice before.
