论文标题
具有复杂捐赠的离散交换经济体中的核心
Cores in discrete exchange economies with complex endowments
论文作者
论文摘要
核心是经济理论中传统且有用的解决方案概念。但是在没有转移的离散交换经济体中，当捐赠是复杂的时候，核心可能是空的。这激发了Balbuzanov和Kotowski（2019）将end赋解释为排除权，并提出了一个名为“排除核心”的新概念。我们的贡献是双重的。首先，我们提出了对核心的纠正，以解决复杂捐赠基础的问题。其次，我们建议对Balbuzanov和Kotowski的排除核心进行改进，以提高其性能。我们的两个核心概念有一个共同的想法，即在阻止联盟时纠正未受影响的代理人的利他主义。我们提出了一种在两个核心中找到分配的机制。
The core is a traditional and useful solution concept in economic theory. But in discrete exchange economies without transfers, when endowments are complex, the core may be empty. This motivates Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019) to interpret endowments as exclusion rights and propose a new concept called exclusion core. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a rectification of the core to solve its problem under complex endowments. Second, we propose a refinement of Balbuzanov and Kotowski's exclusion core to improve its performance. Our two core concepts share a common idea of correcting the misused altruism of unaffected agents in blocking coalitions. We propose a mechanism to find allocations in the two cores.
