论文标题
在投票理论中探索弱势策略的弱点
Exploring Weak Strategy-Proofness in Voting Theory
论文作者
论文摘要
投票是个人偏好的汇总，以选择获胜的替代方案。选择获奖者是通过投票规则完成的，例如排名订单投票，多数股权，多数规则，批准投票。应该使用哪种投票规则？在社会选择理论中，投票规则的理想特性表示为公理可以满足。本文的重点是有关选民战略操纵的公理。有时，选民可能会故意失去自己的真正偏好，以改变其优势的结果。例如，在多元化规则中，如果选民知道他们的最佳选择候选人将会输掉，那么他们可能会投票赞成第二选择候选人，以免避免获得不太理想的结果。如果没有选民联盟能够在战略上操纵联盟，则可以说投票规则可以满足防止战略的公理。限制性较小的公理是薄弱的防策略，而达斯古普（Dasgupta）和马斯汀（Maskin）（2019）定义，它允许除最小的联盟以外的所有人进行战略操纵。在某些直觉条件下，达斯古普塔（Dasgupta）和马斯汀（Maskin，2019年）证明，满足策略策略的唯一投票规则是排序订单投票和多数派规则。在我的论文中，我通过证明排名订单的投票和多数规则仍然是唯一满足弱势策略的投票规则，这是我概括他们的结果。
Voting is the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a winning alternative. Selection of a winner is accomplished via a voting rule, e.g., rank-order voting, majority rule, plurality rule, approval voting. Which voting rule should be used? In social choice theory, desirable properties of voting rules are expressed as axioms to be satisfied. This thesis focuses on axioms concerning strategic manipulation by voters. Sometimes, voters may intentionally misstate their true preferences in order to alter the outcome for their own advantage. For example, in plurality rule, if a voter knows that their top-choice candidate will lose, then they might instead vote for their second-choice candidate just to avoid an even less desirable result. When no coalition of voters can strategically manipulate, then the voting rule is said to satisfy the axiom of Strategy-Proofness. A less restrictive axiom is Weak Strategy-Proofness (as defined by Dasgupta and Maskin (2019)), which allows for strategic manipulation by all but the smallest coalitions. Under certain intuitive conditions, Dasgupta and Maskin (2019) proved that the only voting rules satisfying Strategy-Proofness are rank-order voting and majority rule. In my thesis, I generalize their result, by proving that rank-order voting and majority rule are surprisingly still the only voting rules satisfying Weak Strategy-Proofness.
