论文标题
与广义词典选择规则匹配
Matching with Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules
论文作者
论文摘要
由于需要现实世界中的匹配问题的需要，本文针对由多个部门组成的机构制定了大量的实用选择规则，广义词典选择规则（GLCR）。机构依次填补了他们的划分，每个划分都有一个子选择规则，该规则可满足经典的替代性和大小的单调性，并与我们引入的新属性（配额单调性）结合使用。我们允许以容量转移形式之间的分裂之间进行丰富的互动。机构的总体选择规则定义为其分裂子选择的结合。关于GLCR的累积提供机制（COM）是独特的稳定机制。我们定义了一个基于选择的改进概念，并表明COM尊重改进。我们利用本文在我们的同伴论文Aygün和Turhan（2020）中开发的理论，通过全面的平权行动限制为印度设计令人满意的匹配机制。
Motivated by the need for real-world matching problems, this paper formulates a large class of practical choice rules, Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules (GLCR), for institutions that consist of multiple divisions. Institutions fill their divisions sequentially, and each division is endowed with a sub-choice rule that satisfies classical substitutability and size monotonicity in conjunction with a new property that we introduce, quota monotonicity. We allow rich interactions between divisions in the form of capacity transfers. The overall choice rule of an institution is defined as the union of the sub-choices of its divisions. The cumulative offer mechanism (COM) with respect to GLCR is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism. We define a choice-based improvement notion and show that the COM respects improvements. We employ the theory developed in this paper in our companion paper, Aygün and Turhan (2020), to design satisfactory matching mechanisms for India with comprehensive affirmative action constraints.
