论文标题
网络游戏中纳什平衡的鲁棒性
Robustness of Nash Equilibria in Network Games
论文作者
论文摘要
我们分析了（纯策略）NASH平衡的鲁棒性，用于网络游戏，以防止玩家实用功能的扰动。我们首先得出了鲁棒性边距的简单特征，该曲线定义为扰动的最小幅度，这使得原始游戏停止的纳什平衡在扰动的游戏中如此。然后，我们研究了某些标准网络游戏中最大稳健的平衡是什么，例如协调和反协调游戏。最后，作为一种应用程序，我们为网络游戏中的NASH均衡提供了一些足够的条件，并结合了协调和抗议游戏。
We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude of a perturbation that makes a Nash equilibrium of the original game stop being so in the perturbed game. Then, we investigate what the maximally robust equilibria are in some standard network games such as the coordination and the anti-coordination game. Finally, as an application, we provide some sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in network games with a mixture of coordinating and anticoordinating games.
