论文标题
关系风险模型的游戏理论应用
Game-theoretic applications of a relational risk model
论文作者
论文摘要
该报告提出了风险的概念，概述了风险创世纪所需的两个数学结构：结果的集合，在一般情况下，对其进行了部分优先顺序。结果表明，该最小部分秩序应构成半层次的结构。在某些情况下，应该有一个以某种方式嵌套的半层次系统。在此基础上，风险理论任务的分类是在数学知识专业化的背景下给出的。换句话说，我们谈论的是一种新的关系风险理论的发展。游戏理论表述中的政治决策问题是，对游戏的每个paripatest构成某种嵌套半层次系统的偏好序列的部分偏好，这是关系风险概念实施的一个例子。通过使用各种最优原则获得的问题的解决方案是投资门票的。
The report suggests the concept of risk, outlining two mathematical structures necessary for risk genesis: the set of outcomes and, in a general case, partial order of preference on it. It is shown that this minimum partial order should constitute the structure of a semilattice. In some cases, there should be a system of semilattices nested in a certain way. On this basis, the classification of risk theory tasks is given in the context of specialization of mathematical knowledge. In other words, we are talking about the development of a new rela-tional risk theory. The problem of political decision making in game-theoretic formulation in terms of having partial order of preference on the set of outcomes for each par-ticipant of the game forming a certain system of nested semilattices is consid-ered as an example of a relational risk concept implementation. Solutions to the problem obtained through the use of various optimality principles are investi-gated.
