论文标题
伪造和意识
Falsification and consciousness
论文作者
论文摘要
寻找科学意识理论应导致可伪造的理论。但是，在这里我们表明伪造对于意识理论尤其有问题。我们正式描述用于测试这些理论的标准实验设置。基于理论对某些物理系统（例如大脑）的应用，需要比较理论的预测经验（鉴于系统的某些内部可观察到脑成像数据）与推断的经验（使用报告或行为）。如果推论和预测之间存在不匹配，则伪造了理论。我们表明，如果推论和预测是独立的，那么任何最低信息意识理论都会自动伪造。这是有问题的问题，因为该领域对报告或行为推断有意识的经历意味着这种独立性，因此这种脆弱性影响了许多当代意识理论。此外，我们表明，如果推论和预测严格依赖，那么理论是不可取的。这影响了主张意识由报告或行为决定的理论。最后，我们探索了这一难题的可能出路。
The search for a scientific theory of consciousness should result in theories that are falsifiable. However, here we show that falsification is especially problematic for theories of consciousness. We formally describe the standard experimental setup for testing these theories. Based on a theory's application to some physical system, such as the brain, testing requires comparing a theory's predicted experience (given some internal observables of the system like brain imaging data) with an inferred experience (using report or behavior). If there is a mismatch between inference and prediction, a theory is falsified. We show that if inference and prediction are independent, it follows that any minimally informative theory of consciousness is automatically falsified. This is deeply problematic since the field's reliance on report or behavior to infer conscious experiences implies such independence, so this fragility affects many contemporary theories of consciousness. Furthermore, we show that if inference and prediction are strictly dependent, it follows that a theory is unfalsifiable. This affects theories which claim consciousness to be determined by report or behavior. Finally, we explore possible ways out of this dilemma.
