论文标题

评估OPC UA部署的安全性

Assessing the Security of OPC UA Deployments

论文作者

Roepert, Linus, Dahlmanns, Markus, Fink, Ina Berenice, Pennekamp, Jan, Henze, Martin

论文摘要

为了满足工业部署的不断增长的安全要求,OPC UA是明确设计的最早设计的工业协议之一。但是,将其安全部署需要彻底配置各种选项。因此,必须评估OPC UA部署的安全性及其配置对于确保安全操作,最重要的是工业流程的机密性和完整性。在这项工作中,我们向流行的Metasploit框架提供了扩展,以简化基于网络的OPC UA部署的安全性评估。为此,我们讨论了发现OPC UA服务器,测试其身份验证,获得配置并检查漏洞的方法。最终,我们的工作使操作员能够验证其系统的(安全性)配置并确定潜在的攻击向量。

To address the increasing security demands of industrial deployments, OPC UA is one of the first industrial protocols explicitly designed with security in mind. However, deploying it securely requires a thorough configuration of a wide range of options. Thus, assessing the security of OPC UA deployments and their configuration is necessary to ensure secure operation, most importantly confidentiality and integrity of industrial processes. In this work, we present extensions to the popular Metasploit Framework to ease network-based security assessments of OPC UA deployments. To this end, we discuss methods to discover OPC UA servers, test their authentication, obtain their configuration, and check for vulnerabilities. Ultimately, our work enables operators to verify the (security) configuration of their systems and identify potential attack vectors.

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