论文标题
对安全嵌入软件的故障攻击：威胁，设计和评估
Fault Attacks on Secure Embedded Software: Threats, Design and Evaluation
论文作者
论文摘要
嵌入式软件是根据硬件执行始终正确的假设开发的。故障攻击破裂并利用该假设。通过仔细引入目标故障，对手可以修改软件的控制流或数据流的完整性。然后，将修改的程序执行分析并用作信息泄漏的来源，或作为特权升级的机制。由于现代嵌入式系统的复杂性日益增加，并且由于难以确保正确的硬件执行，即使在弱对手下，故障攻击也是威胁的日益增长。例如，对手必须接近软件的物理执行，以便将可剥削的故障注入硬件，这一假设反复被证明是不正确的。本文是对基于硬件的故障攻击对软件的评论，重点是嵌入式系统的上下文。我们对断层攻击的解剖结构进行了详细讨论，并对故障攻击评估技术进行了审查。本文强调了攻击者的观点，而不是对策发展的观点。但是，我们强调的是，对对策的改进通常基于对攻击的见识。
Embedded software is developed under the assumption that hardware execution is always correct. Fault attacks break and exploit that assumption. Through the careful introduction of targeted faults, an adversary modifies the control-flow or data-flow integrity of software. The modified program execution is then analyzed and used as a source of information leakage, or as a mechanism for privilege escalation. Due to the increasing complexity of modern embedded systems, and due to the difficulty of guaranteeing correct hardware execution even under a weak adversary, fault attacks are a growing threat. For example, the assumption that an adversary has to be close to the physical execution of software, in order to inject an exploitable fault into hardware, has repeatedly been shown to be incorrect. This article is a review on hardware-based fault attacks on software, with emphasis on the context of embedded systems. We present a detailed discussion of the anatomy of a fault attack, and we make a review of fault attack evaluation techniques. The paper emphasizes the perspective from the attacker, rather than the perspective of countermeasure development. However, we emphasize that improvements to countermeasures often build on insight into the attacks.
