论文标题
不对称的党派选民投票率游戏
Asymmetric Partisan Voter Turnout Games
论文作者
论文摘要
由于唐斯（Downs）提议在1957年投票行为是非理性的，因此提出了无数模型来解释投票并说明观察到的投票模式。我们提出了一个模型，在决定是否在选举中弃权，引入大多数其他模型不考虑的不对称性时，党派人士在决定是否弃权时都会考虑其投票的工具和表达优势。允许在选民中学习过程，我们分析了哪些投票率在各种条件下都是可合理化的。我们的模型预测了与选民行为一致的比较静态。此外，放松我们的一些初步假设，消除了我们的模型和经验选民行为之间的一些差异。
Since Downs proposed that the act of voting is irrational in 1957, myriad models have been proposed to explain voting and account for observed turnout patterns. We propose a model in which partisans consider both the instrumental and expressive benefits of their vote when deciding whether or not to abstain in an election, introducing an asymmetry that most other models do not consider. Allowing learning processes within our electorate, we analyze what turnout states are rationalizable under various conditions. Our model predicts comparative statics that are consistent with voter behavior. Furthermore, relaxing some of our preliminary assumptions eliminates some of the discrepancies between our model and empirical voter behavior.
