论文标题
利用对手在图形协调游戏中的意图
Exploiting an Adversary's Intentions in Graphical Coordination Games
论文作者
论文摘要
有关对手意图的信息如何影响最佳系统设计？本文在图形协调游戏的背景下解决了这个问题，在图形协调游戏中，对手可以通过修改其收益来间接影响代理的行为。我们研究了系统操作员必须选择图形拓扑的情况，以期待未知对手的作用。设计师可以通过制定安全策略来限制她最严重的损失，从而有效地计划了打算最大伤害的对手。但是，有关对手意图的细粒度信息可能有助于系统操作员微调防御措施并获得更好的系统性能。在一个简单的对抗行为模型中，本文询问系统操作员可以通过微调已知的对抗意图的防御来获得多少收益。我们发现，如果对手很弱，那么对任何对手类型的安全策略大致最佳。但是，对于中度敏感的对手，安全策略远非最佳。
How does information regarding an adversary's intentions affect optimal system design? This paper addresses this question in the context of graphical coordination games where an adversary can indirectly influence the behavior of agents by modifying their payoffs. We study a situation in which a system operator must select a graph topology in anticipation of the action of an unknown adversary. The designer can limit her worst-case losses by playing a security strategy, effectively planning for an adversary which intends maximum harm. However, fine-grained information regarding the adversary's intention may help the system operator to fine-tune the defenses and obtain better system performance. In a simple model of adversarial behavior, this paper asks how much a system operator can gain by fine-tuning a defense for known adversarial intent. We find that if the adversary is weak, a security strategy is approximately optimal for any adversary type; however, for moderately-strong adversaries, security strategies are far from optimal.
