论文标题
理由的模型
A Model of Justification
论文作者
论文摘要
我认为决策受到道德，理性或其他美德的考虑。决策者（DM）对成果具有真正的偏好，但被迫在以某种偏好为主的结果中选择他认为“合理”的结果。该模型将有关分销偏好，慈善捐赠，偏见/歧视以及腐败/贿赂的广泛经验工作结合在一起。我提供了模型的行为表征。我还表明，当知道真实偏好时，可以从选择行为中识别出一组理由，而选择行为在不知道时实质上限制了真实的偏好和理由。我认为，合理性模型代表了对现有合理化模型的进步，因为它置于可能的“理由”上的结构改善了障碍性，解释和识别。
I consider decision-making constrained by considerations of morality, rationality, or other virtues. The decision maker (DM) has a true preference over outcomes, but feels compelled to choose among outcomes that are top-ranked by some preference that he considers "justifiable." This model unites a broad class of empirical work on distributional preferences, charitable donations, prejudice/discrimination, and corruption/bribery. I provide a behavioral characterization of the model. I also show that the set of justifications can be identified from choice behavior when the true preference is known, and that choice behavior substantially restricts both the true preference and justifications when neither is known. I argue that the justifiability model represents an advancement over existing models of rationalization because the structure it places on possible "rationales" improves tractability, interpretation and identification.
