论文标题
付款渠道的故障安全守望台和短暂的断言
Fail-safe Watchtowers and Short-lived Assertions for Payment Channels
论文作者
论文摘要
付款渠道及其扩展的最新开发(例如,州渠道)为区块链提供了有希望的可伸缩性解决方案,这使得不信任的当事方可以通过链上的链接智能合约来交易链,并解决潜在的争议。为了保护无法不断访问区块链的参与者,提出了一种名为Watchtower的观看服务 - 第三方实体有义务监视频道状态(代表参与者),并在必要时纠正它们。不幸的是,目前提出的守望台计划遭受了多个安全性和效率缺陷。在本文中,我们探讨了WatchTowers背后的设计空间。我们提出了一种新颖的观看服务,称为“故障守望台”。与先前提议的观看服务相反,我们的安全性守望台不会不断观看链接智能合约。取而代之的是,它仅发送一条定期确认或拒绝关闭渠道的最终状态的单个链上消息。我们的守望台可以轻松处理大量频道,具有隐私性,并且可以容忍多个攻击向量。此外,我们表明(一般而言)对守望者(通常)对于多种付款方案来说可能是经济上不合理的选择,并且我们引入了一个简单而有力的短暂断言的概念,这些概念可以减轻这些情况下的不当行为。
The recent development of payment channels and their extensions (e.g., state channels) provides a promising scalability solution for blockchains which allows untrusting parties to transact off-chain and resolve potential disputes via on-chain smart contracts. To protect participants who have no constant access to the blockchain, a watching service named as watchtower is proposed -- a third-party entity obligated to monitor channel states (on behalf of the participants) and correct them on-chain if necessary. Unfortunately, currently proposed watchtower schemes suffer from multiple security and efficiency drawbacks. In this paper, we explore the design space behind watchtowers. We propose a novel watching service named as fail-safe watchtowers. In contrast to prior proposed watching services, our fail-safe watchtower does not watch on-chain smart contracts constantly. Instead, it only sends a single on-chain message periodically confirming or denying the final states of channels being closed. Our watchtowers can easily handle a large number of channels, are privacy-preserving, and fail-safe tolerating multiple attack vectors. Furthermore, we show that watchtowers (in general) may be an option economically unjustified for multiple payment scenarios and we introduce a simple, yet powerful concept of short-lived assertions which can mitigate misbehaving parties in these scenarios.