论文标题
平行网络上的两人网络路由游戏的Stackelberg Equilibria
Stackelberg Equilibria for Two-Player Network Routing Games on Parallel Networks
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了一个两人零和零网络路由游戏，其中路由器希望最大化从给定源节点流向目的地节点的合法流量，而攻击者希望通过为网络淹没网络，以阻止尽可能多的合法流量。我们使用不对称信息来解决场景，路由器必须在攻击者决定如何在网络链接之间分配恶意流量之前揭示其策略，而网络链接自然而然地通过Stackelberg Eqeilibria的概念来建模。该论文重点关注并行网络，其中包括三个主要贡献：我们表明，计算针对给定路由策略的最佳攻击策略是NP-顽固的问题；我们确定了stackelberg均衡的条件，并没有遗憾。我们提供了一个可以用来量化攻击者功能不确定性限制路由器性能的不确定性的指标。
We consider a two-player zero-sum network routing game in which a router wants to maximize the amount of legitimate traffic that flows from a given source node to a destination node and an attacker wants to block as much legitimate traffic as possible by flooding the network with malicious traffic. We address scenarios with asymmetric information, in which the router must reveal its policy before the attacker decides how to distribute the malicious traffic among the network links, which is naturally modeled by the notion of Stackelberg equilibria. The paper focuses on parallel networks, and includes three main contributions: we show that computing the optimal attack policy against a given routing policy is an NP-hard problem; we establish conditions under which the Stackelberg equilibria lead to no regret; and we provide a metric that can be used to quantify how uncertainty about the attacker's capabilities limits the router's performance.
