论文标题
妥协，不要优化：概括完美的贝叶斯平衡以允许歧义
Compromise, Don't Optimize: Generalizing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to Allow for Ambiguity
论文作者
论文摘要
我们介绍了一个解决方案概念，以供广泛的不完整信息游戏形式游戏，其中玩家不需要为他们对游戏不了解的知识分配可能性。这嵌入了一个模型中，玩家可以持有多个先验。玩家通过寻找在每个更新的先验下产生良好表现的妥协来做出选择。我们的解决方案概念称为完美的折衷平衡。它概括了完美的贝叶斯平衡。我们展示了它如何应对古尔诺（Cournot）和伯特兰（Bertrand）市场的歧义，公共商品提供，Spence的就业市场信号，具有共同价值的双边贸易以及预测。
We introduce a solution concept for extensive-form games of incomplete information in which players need not assign likelihoods to what they do not know about the game. This is embedded in a model in which players can hold multiple priors. Players make choices by looking for compromises that yield a good performance under each of their updated priors. Our solution concept is called perfect compromise equilibrium. It generalizes perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We show how it deals with ambiguity in Cournot and Bertrand markets, public good provision, Spence's job market signaling, bilateral trade with common value, and forecasting.
