论文标题
基于中央运营商与分散的生产商之间的协调,多代理维护计划
Multi-agent maintenance scheduling based on the coordination between central operator and decentralized producers in an electricity market
论文作者
论文摘要
基于条件的和预测性维护能够尽早发现关键系统条件,从而使决策者能够防止故障并减轻故障。但是,决策者还需要考虑运营和生产需求,以便在安排维护活动时进行最佳决策。特别是在网络系统(例如电网)中,关于维护单个资产的决定可能会影响整个网络,因此更为复杂。本文提出了针对电力市场中电网生成维护决策(GMS)的两级多代理决策支持系统。 GM的目的是最大程度地降低生成成本,同时最大化系统的可靠性。提出的框架集成了中央协调系统,即传输系统运营商(TSO),以及代表发电单元的分布式代理,这些单元行动以最大程度地利用其利润并确定最佳的维护时间插槽,同时确保满足能源需求。代理商(发电公司)的目标功能基于他们从电力生产和由于失败引起的生产损失之间的相互作用所获得的奖励和罚款。然后,使用分布式算法得出代理的最佳策略,在该算法中,代理选择其最佳维护决策并将其决策发送到中央协调系统。 TSO决定是否通过考虑市场可靠性方面和电源限制来接受代理商的决定。为了解决这个协调问题,我们提出了使用激励信号来协调代理和中央系统的决策的谈判算法,以便中央系统可以接受所有代理的决定。我们使用IEEE 39总线系统证明了我们提出的算法的效率。
Condition-based and predictive maintenance enable early detection of critical system conditions and thereby enable decision makers to forestall faults and mitigate them. However, decision makers also need to take the operational and production needs into consideration for optimal decision-making when scheduling maintenance activities. Particularly in network systems, such as power grids, decisions on the maintenance of single assets can affect the entire network and are, therefore, more complex. This paper proposes a two-level multi-agent decision support systems for the generation maintenance decision (GMS) of power grids in an electricity markets. The aim of the GMS is to minimize the generation cost while maximizing the system reliability. The proposed framework integrates a central coordination system, i.e. the transmission system operator (TSO), and distributed agents representing power generation units that act to maximize their profit and decide about the optimal maintenance time slots while ensuring the fulfilment of the energy demand. The objective function of agents (power generation companies) is based on the reward and the penalty that they obtain from the interplay between power production and loss of production due to failure, respectively. The optimal strategy of agents is then derived using a distributed algorithm, where agents choose their optimal maintenance decision and send their decisions to the central coordinating system. The TSO decides whether to accept the agents' decisions by considering the market reliability aspects and power supply constraints. To solve this coordination problem, we propose a negotiation algorithm using an incentive signal to coordinate the agents' and central system's decisions such that all the agents' decisions can be accepted by the central system. We demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed algorithm using a IEEE 39 bus system.