论文标题
无线频道对基于深度学习的调制分类器的无线对抗攻击
Over-the-Air Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning Based Modulation Classifier over Wireless Channels
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑由发射器,接收器和对手组成的无线通信系统。发射器传输具有不同调制类型的信号,而接收器将其接收的信号分类为使用基于深度学习的分类器的调制类型。同时,对手进行的过度传输与发射器的信号叠加在一起,以欺骗接收器的分类器以犯错误。虽然这种逃避攻击最近引起了人们的兴趣,但到目前为止,从对手到接收者的渠道效应已被忽略,以至于先前的攻击机制不能在逼真的渠道效应下应用。在本文中,我们介绍了如何通过考虑从对手到接收者的渠道来发起现实的逃避攻击。我们的结果表明,调制分类容易受到对无线通道的对抗性攻击的影响,该通道被建模为雷利(Rayleigh)逐渐消失,并散发路径损失和阴影。我们就有关渠道,发射器输入和分类器体系结构的信息的可用性提出了各种对抗性攻击。首先,我们提出两种类型的对抗攻击,即针对目标攻击(具有最小功率)和非目标攻击,旨在将分类更改为目标标签或除了真实标签以外的任何其他标签。两者都是白色框攻击,它们是发射器输入特异性的,并使用通道信息。然后,我们引入了一种算法,以使用有限的通道信息来生成对抗性攻击,而对手只知道频道分布。最后,我们提出了一个黑盒通用对抗扰动(UAP)攻击,其中对手对通道和发射器输入的了解有限。
We consider a wireless communication system that consists of a transmitter, a receiver, and an adversary. The transmitter transmits signals with different modulation types, while the receiver classifies its received signals to modulation types using a deep learning-based classifier. In the meantime, the adversary makes over-the-air transmissions that are received as superimposed with the transmitter's signals to fool the classifier at the receiver into making errors. While this evasion attack has received growing interest recently, the channel effects from the adversary to the receiver have been ignored so far such that the previous attack mechanisms cannot be applied under realistic channel effects. In this paper, we present how to launch a realistic evasion attack by considering channels from the adversary to the receiver. Our results show that modulation classification is vulnerable to an adversarial attack over a wireless channel that is modeled as Rayleigh fading with path loss and shadowing. We present various adversarial attacks with respect to availability of information about channel, transmitter input, and classifier architecture. First, we present two types of adversarial attacks, namely a targeted attack (with minimum power) and non-targeted attack that aims to change the classification to a target label or to any other label other than the true label, respectively. Both are white-box attacks that are transmitter input-specific and use channel information. Then we introduce an algorithm to generate adversarial attacks using limited channel information where the adversary only knows the channel distribution. Finally, we present a black-box universal adversarial perturbation (UAP) attack where the adversary has limited knowledge about both channel and transmitter input.