论文标题
RTO频率调节市场清除公式以及机会成本对电价的影响
RTO Frequency Regulation Market Clearing Formulations and the Effect of Opportunity Costs on Electricity Prices
论文作者
论文摘要
区域传输操作员每个都有独特的方法来采购用于跟踪网格上实际功率波动的频率调节储备。与其他市场相比，某些市场清算实践导致高监管价格较高。我们介绍了ISO新英格兰，PJM互连和中大陆ISO的频率调节市场清除公式（从运营商的关税中）。我们提供测试案例示例，以解释每个系统运营商中看到的历史性市场定价行为，并得出结论，这是由于包括估计的机会成本损失的市场清算。
The Regional Transmission Operators each have unique methods to procure frequency regulation reserves used to track real power fluctuations on the grid. Some market clearing practices result in high regulation prices with large spread compared to other markets. We present the frequency regulation market clearing formulations--as derived from operator tariffs--of the ISO New England, PJM Interconnection, and Midcontinent ISO. We offer test case examples to explain the historic market pricing behavior seen within each system operator and conclude this behavior is due to the inclusion of estimated lost opportunity costs in market clearing.
