论文标题
举一个例子：合作演变中的信号威胁
Making an Example: Signalling Threat in the Evolution of Cooperation
论文作者
论文摘要
已经建议将社会惩罚作为确保一击（即未重复）相互作用的高水平合作和规范合规性的关键方法。但是，已经证明它仅在惩罚高度效率时起作用。另一方面，信号的报应回到了中世纪的主权，就在法语中的绞刑架的词源于拉丁语中的力量，并成为了高级正义无情的严峻象征。在这里，我们介绍了信号的惩罚行为和一种特殊类型的叛逃者的机制，可以识别出这种信号并避免因恐惧而惩罚的机制。我们描述了威胁信号可以维持高水平合作的分析条件。此外，我们进行了广泛的基于代理的模拟，以确认和扩展我们对影响社会惩罚成功的外部因素的理解。我们表明，即使信号是昂贵的或惩罚是不切实际的，我们建议的机制也会催化合作。我们观察到广告报应行为的预防性，并认为在AI和多代理系统的背景下，由此产生的社会繁荣是理想的结果。总而言之，我们认为恐惧是对亲社会行为的有效刺激。
Social punishment has been suggested as a key approach to ensuring high levels of cooperation and norm compliance in one-shot (i.e. non-repeated) interactions. However, it has been shown that it only works when punishment is highly cost-efficient. On the other hand, signalling retribution hearkens back to medieval sovereignty, insofar as the very word for gallows in French stems from the Latin word for power and serves as a grim symbol of the ruthlessness of high justice. Here we introduce the mechanism of signalling an act of punishment and a special type of defector emerges, one who can recognise this signal and avoid punishment by way of fear. We describe the analytical conditions under which threat signalling can maintain high levels of cooperation. Moreover, we perform extensive agent-based simulations so as to confirm and expand our understanding of the external factors that influence the success of social punishment. We show that our suggested mechanism catalyses cooperation, even when signalling is costly or when punishment would be impractical. We observe the preventive nature of advertising retributive acts and we contend that the resulting social prosperity is a desirable outcome in the contexts of AI and multi-agent systems. To conclude, we argue that fear acts as an effective stimulus to pro-social behaviour.
