论文标题
多目标正常形式游戏中基于公用事业的平衡分析
A utility-based analysis of equilibria in multi-objective normal form games
论文作者
论文摘要
在多目标多代理系统（MOMAS）中，代理明确考虑了相互矛盾的目标功能之间可能的权衡。我们认为，应根据这些妥协对系统的用户的实用程序进行分析，在MOMA中竞争目标之间的妥协，在该实用程序中，代理商的实用程序功能将其回报向量映射到标量实用程序值。这种基于公用事业的方法自然会导致对MOMAS中代理的两个不同的优化标准：预期标量回报（ESR）和标量的预期回报（SER）。在本文中，我们使用多目标正常形式游戏（MONFGS）的框架探讨了这两个标准之间的差异。我们证明，当使用非线性实用程序函数时，优化标准（ESR或SER）的选择可以从根本上改变MONFG中的平衡集。
In multi-objective multi-agent systems (MOMAS), agents explicitly consider the possible tradeoffs between conflicting objective functions. We argue that compromises between competing objectives in MOMAS should be analysed on the basis of the utility that these compromises have for the users of a system, where an agent's utility function maps their payoff vectors to scalar utility values. This utility-based approach naturally leads to two different optimisation criteria for agents in a MOMAS: expected scalarised returns (ESR) and scalarised expected returns (SER). In this article, we explore the differences between these two criteria using the framework of multi-objective normal form games (MONFGs). We demonstrate that the choice of optimisation criterion (ESR or SER) can radically alter the set of equilibria in a MONFG when non-linear utility functions are used.
