论文标题
通过免疫力比较学校的选择和大学入学机制与战略入学
Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions
论文作者
论文摘要
最近，世界各地数十个学区和大学录取系统改革了他们的录取规则。为了进行这些改革的主要动机，决策者列举了规则的战略缺陷：学生有强烈的激励措施来游戏，这对非战略学生造成了巨大的后果。但是，几乎没有新规则是防策略的。我们解释了这个难题。我们表明，在改革之后，规则变得更加不受战略录取的影响：每个学生都收到了一组较小的学校，他可以使用战略，从而削弱了操纵动力。同时，每所学校的录取成为一组较大学生的策略，使学校更适合非战略学生使用。我们还表明，由于Pathak和Sönmez（2013）引起的拼图的现有解释是不完整的。
Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new rules were strategy-proof. We explain this puzzle. We show that after the reforms the rules became more immune to strategic admissions: each student received a smaller set of schools that he can get in using a strategy, weakening incentives to manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools more available for non-strategic students. We also show that the existing explanation of the puzzle due to Pathak and Sönmez (2013) is incomplete.
