论文标题
效率公理用于简单复合物
Efficiency Axioms for simplicial complexes
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了简单络合物合作游戏效率的概念。在这样的游戏中，可能禁止大联盟$ [n] $，因此，研究合作游戏$（δ，v）$的收益总数$v_Δ$是一个非平凡的问题。 我们通过表征满足一般有效需求的单个值$v_Δ^{gen} $的单个值来解决这个问题，以进行通用效率分配。传统和概率效率被视为这种普遍效率的特殊情况。 最后，我们引入了一种新的效率概念，该概念是由简单复合物$δ$的组合和拓扑特性引起的。在这种情况下的效率称为简单，我们表征满足此约束的个体值。
We study the notion of efficiency for cooperative games on simplicial complexes. In such games, the grand coalition $[n]$ may be forbidden, and, thus, it is a non-trivial problem to study the total number of payoff $v_Δ$ of a cooperative game $(Δ, v)$. We address this question in the more general setting, by characterizing the individual values that satisfy the general efficient requirement $v_Δ^{gen}$ for a generic efficiency assignment. The traditional and the probabilistic efficiency are treated as a special case of this general efficiency. Finally, we introduce a new notion of efficiency arising from the combinatorial and topological property of the simplicial complex $Δ$. The efficiency in this scenario is called simplicial and we characterize the individual values fulfilling this constraint.
